



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BOLIVIA-CUBA-CHILE: Chilean-based leftist Bolivian exiles are probably disappointed with the outcome of their recent meeting with Fidel Castro.

The would-be insurgents of the Anti-Imperialist Revolutionary Front (FRA) reportedly returned to Santiago from Havana on 6 February, apparently without a firm Cuban pledge of significant financial aid or a timetable for arms shipments. Castro is said to have offered to provide paramilitary training to the front's members, however.

Lacking even a unified command structure or an acceptable plan of action, the three-month-old front fails to meet Castro's current pragmatic standards for gauging a revolutionary group's worthiness for Cuban support. While Castro supposedly promised to provide an "unlimited" supply of arms, he said that they would have to be shipped to Chile and this could be done only with the consent of President Allende, which he did not think would be forthcoming.

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[redacted] the Soviets do not want to see a premature armed struggle in Bolivia. Soviet representatives may be pushing the same cautious line with Havana. Historical and psychological factors in the Bolivian case (Che Guevara was killed there in 1967) may yet make Castro overlook the FRA's shortcomings and bring forth a major Cuban commitment despite the obstacles, but the front's delegation evidently failed to elicit such a response.

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Although at least one of its components probably could carry out limited terrorist activities, the FRA cannot yet mount a sustained campaign in Bolivia.

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